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WHOSE RIGHTS? WHY STATES SHOULD
SET THE PARAMETERS FOR FEDERAL
HONEST SERVICES MAIL AND WIRE
FRAUD PROSECUTIONS
Abstract: The citizens and governments of states and localities have a
federal statutory right to the "honest services" of their public officials.
The federal statutes that criminalize conduct impinging on this right,
however, do not clearly define the parameters of the term "honest ser-
vices," and, as a result, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have differed in their
interpretation of what conduct comprises a violation of the statute. The
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits have held that, in
order for there to be a federal crime, the "honest services" must be owed
under state or local law. Meanwhile, the First Circuit has held that such a
state or local law violation is not a necessary prerequisite to the federal
crime. This Note argues that, due to federalism and the nature of public
corruption, the former approach strikes the appropriate balance between
state sovereignty and the federal interest in good government.
INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 1997, plaintiffs' lawyer Paul Minor stormed into a
Kmart store in Jackson, Mississippi.' Minor had recently won a $3.4
million verdict against the mega retailer for three of his clients, but
Kmart had not taken any steps toward paying that judgment. 2 Minor
intended to collect the judgment by emptying the store's registers. 3 As
local television cameras rolled, he lambasted Kmart for its inaction. 4
The brash attorney did not leave the store with a bag of cash, but his
tactics did prove to be successful; Kmart posted a bond that same days
Paul Minor's behavior often pushes boundaries, but he has been
accused recently of going too far. 6 In 2003, the Bush administration
targeted Mississippi as fertile ground for tort reform.? To this end, FBI
agents began looking into the campaign funding sources of Missis-
I See Andrew Longstreth, Mississippi Maelstrom, 11 CORP. COUNS. 150, 150 (Nov. 2004).
2 See id.
9
 See id.
4
 See id.
5
 See id.
6 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150; Scott Horton, A Minor Injustice: Why Paul Minor?,
HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/10/hbc-90001943.
7 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150; Horton, supra note 6.
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sippi judges, and Minor's name surfaced. 8 He had guaranteed a loan
to help Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Oliver Diaz secure election
financing. 9
 Pursuant to this investigation, the Department of Justice
("DOD filed charges against Minor, alleging that, because he prac-
ticed in front of Justice Diaz, his guaranty violated federal laws prohib-
iting an individual from participating in a scheme intended to deprive
a state and/or its citizens of the honest services of a public official.°
Although Minor's actions may appear unseemly, there is no Mis-
sissippi state law prohibiting an attorney who practices in front of a
judge from financially assisting that judge in a campaign. 0 This indi-
cates that the citizens or the government of Mississippi, or both, do
not feel that such actions defraud them of their right to the honest
services of their judges. 12 Furthermore, courts such as the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have overturned state laws at-
tempting to limit judges' capacity to raise funds in this manner. 15 The
federal government nonetheless prosecuted Minor, and the absence
of an applicable Mississippi state law brought the case under a federal
common law standard of good government."
To complicate matters further, this common law standard was
asserted by a Republican-headed DOJ, and Paul Minor is the son of a
locally well-known liberal newspaper columnist and has made substan-
tial financial contributions to the Democratic Party.° Consequently,
many commentators allege that Minor's prosecution was politically
motivated.° Motivations aside, Minor's case is illustrative of the dan-
See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150; Horton, supra note 6.
° See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 153; Horton, supra note 6; see also Letter from Paul Mi-
nor to U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 22, 2007), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Minor071022.pdf  (explaining that Minor guaran-
teed the loan in an attempt to help offset money contributed to Diaz's opponent by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, which had identified Diaz as "and-business").
'° See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150, 152; Horton, supra note 6.
11 See Horton, supra note 6 (explaining that, not only is there no such Mississippi law,
but that the practice is commonplace).
12 See id,
' 8 See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that section
(B) (2) of Canon 7 of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judicial can-
didates from personally soliciting campaign contributions, impermissibly chilled candi-
dates' speech and thus violated the First Amendment).
14 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150; Horton, supra note 6.
15 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 152; Horton, supra note 6.
16 See Horton, supra note 6; see also Legal Schnauzer, hup://legalschnauzer.blogspot.com
(Sept. 24, 2007, 12:30 EST) [hereinafter Mississippi Churning]. Mississippi Churning is a
series of approximately forty postings written by Roger Studer, an Alabama journalist, appear-
ing on his blog, Legal Schnauzer. Sce generally Legal Schnauzer, http://legalschnauzer.
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gers to state sovereignty posed by federal prosecution of state and lo-
cal corruption, particularly when such prosecutions are governed by a
federal common law standard. 17
Minor was indicted and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1343,
and 1346. 18 Together, these statutes form the basis of what is known as
"honest services mail or wire fraud." 18 Currently, the United States
Courts of Appeals have split on whether the behavior of a defendant
such as Paul Minor must violate state or local law before it can be
prosecuted within the federal framework. 2° The Fifth Circuit has held
that a violation of state or local law is a necessary prerequisite to a
federal honest services fraud prosecution, and the Third Circuit has
noted its approval of this position. 21 Meanwhile, the First Circuit and
other circuits have held that such a requirement is not only unneces-
sary, but that a discussion of state law at a federal trial presents the
opportunity for unfair prejudice to the defendant. 22
This Note addresses this circuit split and argues that the proper
approach is to require that a defendant's conduct violate state or local
blogspot.com. Throughout the postings, Shuler argues that Minor and a series of other
prominent southern Democrats have been the victims of politically motivated selective prose-
cutions brought by the Bush administration. See id.; cf. Dan Eggen, Ex-Attorney General Says
Politics Drove Federal Prosecution, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2007, at AS (detailing claims of politi-
cally motivated prosecutions for mail and wire fraud, including a former U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral's accusation that the Bush administration's DOJ had political motivations when it prose-
cuted an outspoken and highly visible Democratic figure in Pennsylvania for mail fraud and
other crimes).
17 See Horton, supra note 6; Mississippi Churning, supra note 16. Both Horton and
Shuler's accounts of Minor's prosecution demonstrate that a federal prosecutor can bring
charges in connection with the actions of a state or local public official quite easily and
that the choice to undertake such a prosecution may not always align with the values of the
state or local electorate. See Horton, supra note 6; Mississippi Churning, supra note 16.
113 See Third Superceding Indictment at 3-4, United States v. Minor, No. 3:03crI2OWS
(S.D. Miss. Dec. 6, 2005).
19 See 18 U.S.C.A. 55 1341, 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); 18 U.S.C. 5 1346 (2000).
2° See United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 2003) (demonstrating sup-
port, in dicta, for an approach requiring a state law limiting principle for honest services
fraud); United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that state
law, rather than federal common law, offers a better limiting principle of determining
when an official's failure to disclose a conflict of interest amounts to honest services
fraud); United States v. Sawyer (Sawyer II ), 239 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that, in order for conduct to consti-
tute honest services fraud, the services must be owed under state law); United States v.
Sawyer (Sawyer 1), 85 F.3d 713, 726 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that a violation of common law
may suffice as the basis for honest services fraud); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a scheme to defraud need not violate state law in order to
constitute honest services fraud).
21 See Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117; Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93; Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734.
" See Sawyer 1, 85 F.311 at 726; Bryan, 58 F.3d at 940.
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law before it can be prosecuted federally as holiest services mail or
wire fraud. Part I of the Note traces the legislative history of the mail
and wire fraud statutes and the judicial and legislative actions taken
with respect to the inclusion of the right to honest services within the
scope of these statutes. 25 Part II discusses the current circuit split and
the rationales for the competing positions. 24 Part III addresses poten-
tial justifications for allowing the federal government to prosecute
state and local corruption in light of the Supreme Court's recent
preference for limiting the scope of federal regulatory power. 25 Part
IV provides a specific justification for federal honest services mail and
wire fraud prosecutions in connection with state and local public cor-
ruption. 26 Finally, Part V addresses the need to place sensible limits on
such prosecutions and argues that the approach taken by the Third
and Fifth Circuits is therefore the most appropriate. 27
I. THE MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD STATUTES: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343, AND 1346
The federal mail fraud statute criminalizes the use of the mails in
"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or prom-
ises."28 The federal wire fraud statute criminalizes any transmission by
wire, radio or television in interstate or foreign commerce for the pur-
pose of executing a scheme or artifice to defraud. 29 There have been
federal statutes criminalizing this type of behavior since the late 19th
century, but, since the inception of the current statutes, the scope of
the conduct that they criminalize has remained an unsettled matter."
23 See infra notes 28-59 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 60-130 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 131-156 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 157-209 and accompanying text,
27 See infra notes 210-236 and accompanying text.
25 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
" See id. § 1393.
56 See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 95 F.2d 873, 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1938) (affirming
conviction under the mail fraud statute where defendants issued false medical diplomas
and licenses to persons without medical education); United States v. Randle, 39 F. Supp.
759, 759-60 (W.D. La. 1941) (holding that the mail fraud statute could not be applied to
election fraud because neither the voters nor the state had been defrauded of any money
or property). Alexander and Randle are illustrative of the judicial branch's historical strug-
gle to determine if mail, and later wire, fraud criminalize schemes that defraud their vic-
tims of only intangible rights and not money or property. See Alexander, 95 F.2d at 875, 881;
Randle, 39 F. Supp. at 759-60.
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A. The First Mail Fraud Statute
The first mail fraud statute was enacted by the forty-second Con-
gress in 1872. 31 This statute contained broad language making it illegal
to use the mails in connection with "any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud."32 The limited legislative history for this bill indicates that Con-
gress intended to protect citizens from deprivation of only tangible as-
sets, such as money or property"
Thirty-two years later, in 1909, Congress codified this intent more
precisely." The statute was amended to say "or for obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises .. . "35 In the years following this amendment, fed-
eral courts of appeals expanded their interpretation of the scope of
the mail fraud statute beyond just those instances where the victim
was defrauded of tangible assets, whether money or property. 38 They
began to interpret the statute as criminalizing schemes intended to
deprive victims of intangible rights as well, such as the right to honest
services.37 Courts eventually decided that this new honest services
doctrine included the right of citizens and governments to have to
have their public officials perform their duties honestly. 38
B. The Addition of Wire Fraud
In 1952, Congress expanded the coverage of federal fraud protec-
tions by enacting the wire fraud statute.39 Section 1343 criminalizes the
transmission of writings, signs, signals, pictures or sounds by means of
wire, radio or television, in interstate or foreign commerce, for the
purpose of executing a scheme. or artifice to defraud.° The legislative
31 See Act ofJune 8, 1872, ch. 335, §§ 149, 301, 17 Stat, 302, 323.
" See id.
" See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870). The bill's sponsor, Rep. Farns-
worth, remarked that such a law was needed to prevent fraud by thieves, forgers, and rap-
scallions generally." Id.
54 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130.
" See id.
38 See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the
mail fraud statute protects an electoral body's right to fair elections); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that an indictment under the mail fraud
statute may state an offense even though it does not contain allegations that anyone was
defrauded of money or property).
37 See Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1153; States, 488 F.2d at 766.
38 See Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1153.
39 Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 18(a), 66 Stat. 722 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)).
40 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343.
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history of § 1343 is sparse, but courts soon realized that the statute ap-
peared to be closely patterned after the mail fraud statute. 41 These find-
ings were due in large part to the fact that, although the two statutes
differ with respect to the elements necessary to trigger federal jurisdic-
tion, they use the identical language to define the criminal conduct. 42
Relying on the similarity of the language in the two statutes, federal
appeals courts have traditionally held that the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes share a common raison d'etre and should therefore be interpreted
Mari passu. 43 Thus, those courts have held that the two statutes criminal-
ize different types of behavior within the same types of schemes."
Therefore, in early years of the wire fraud statute, it, like the mail fraud
statute, was interpreted as protecting intangible rights such as the right
to honest services. 46
C. Limiting the Reach of the Statutes: McNally v. United States
Courts continued to enforce citizens' and governments' right to
holiest political services under § 1341 and § 1343 until the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 1987 decision in McNally v. United States." In McNally, a
combination of private citizens and Kentucky state officials were con-
victed of mail fraud under § 1341. 47 The charges were brought in con-
nection with a self-dealing patronage scheme in which the defendants •
used the snails to defraud the citizens and government of Kentucky of
their intangible right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1387 n.3, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)
(noting that, although the legislative history of § 1343 is sparse, it appears to be patterned
after § 1341, thereby indicating that the two statutes protect against the same types of
schemes); United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that § 1393
was patterned after § 1341).
42 compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341, with id. § 1343. Both statutes use the language any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property" to define the criminal
conduct. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1391, 1343.
43 See Lenderman, 576 F.2d at 1387-88; Donahue, 539 F.2d at 1135.
44 See Louderman, 576 F.2d at 1387-88; Donahue, 539 F.2d at 1135.
45 See Lourkrman, 576 F.2d at 1387-88; Donahue, 539 F.2d at 1135. •
46 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352 (1987), superseded by statute, Pub. L.
No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988); States, 488 F.2d at 766; United States v.
George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that, in the private context, the gov-
ernment, in order to obtain an honest services conviction, need not show that the victim
of the scheme was actually defrauded or suffered a loss); United States v. Faser, 303 F.
Supp. 380, 384-85 (E.D. La. 1969) (holding that that the government need not be de-
frauded of tangible assets such as money or property in order to successfully prosecute an
honest services fraud claim).
47 See McNally, 483 U.S. at 352.
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honestly.48 Specifically, a state official instructed a company acting as
Kentucky's workers' compensation agent to funnel commission checks
to companies owned by the official and the other defendants, in ex-
change for a continued relationship with the state. 49
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions." The Court
held that § 1341 and § 1343 were limited to the protection of property
rights and did not cover intangible rights such as the right to honest
senices.51 In its decision, the Court relied heavily upon the legislative
history of the original mail fraud statute. 52 It noted that the phrase
added by the 1909 amendment "simply made it unmistakable that the
statute reached false promises and misrepresentations as to the future
as well as other frauds involving money or property." 53 The Court went
on to note that if it were to construe §§ 1341 and 1343 as including
honest services fraud, the statutes' outer boundaries would remain am-
biguous." As a result, the federal government could possibly become
impermissibly involved in setting standards of good government for
local and state officials. 55 The Court did, however, invite Congress to
speak more clearly regarding whether §§ 1341 and 1343 provided the
right to honest services. 56
D. Congress Answers the Court
In response to the McNally decision, Congress, in 1988, enacted 18
U.S.C. § 1346.57 Section 1346 explicitly identifies the intangible right of
honest services as within the scope of §§ 1341 and 1343, the mail and
wire fraud statutes." In the legislative history of § 1346, Senator Joseph
Bider specifically stated that the Congressional intent of the statute was
48 See id.
48 See id. at 352-53. Interestingly, the Court did not discuss why McNally and his co-
defendants were not charged under federal bribery statutes, even though their conduct
seemingly violated these statutes as well. See id.
58 See id. at 352.
51 See id. at 359-60.
52 McNally, 483 U.S. at 358-59.
55 Id.
54 See id. at 360.
55 See id.
58 See id.
57 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603,102 Stat. 4181,4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(2000)).
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The statute indicates that, for the purposes of mail and wire
fraud, "the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services." Id.
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to reinstate the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the scope of the mail
and wire fraud statutes.59
H. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 expressly legitimized mail and
wire fraud prosecutions under the honest services rubric.° The defi-
nition of honest services, however, remains an unsettled issue, particu-
larly as applied to the conduct of public officials. 61 The federal courts
of appeals are split with respect to whether a defendant's conduct
must violate a state or local law before he or she can be prosecuted
federally for defrauding the citizens of their, or government of its,
right to a public official's honest services. 62 The Fifth Circuit has held
that a violation of state or local law is a necessary prerequisite to a
federal honest services fraud prosecution, and the Third Circuit has
noted its approval of this position. 63 Meanwhile, other circuits, includ-
ing the First Circuit, have held that such a violation is not necessary."
59 See 134 CONG. REC. S17,360-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden). Senator Biden re-
marked specifically that, under the amendment, § 1341 and § 1343 will protect any per-
son's intangible right to the honest services of another, including the right of the public to
the honest services of public officials. Id. Biden also remarked that the intent of the
amendment was to reinstate all of the pre-MeNallly case law pertaining to the mail and wire
fraud statutes, without change. Id.
6° See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000);
134 Corm. Rzc. 517360-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden).
61 See United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 2003) (demonstrating sup-
port, in dicta, for an approach requiring a state law limiting principle for honest services
fraud); United States is Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that state
law, rather than federal common law, offers a better limiting principle of determining
when an official's failure to disclose a conflict of interest amounts to honest services
fraud); United States v. Sawyer (Sawyer!!), 239 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2001); United States
Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that, in order for conduct to consti-
tute honest services fraud, the services must be owed under state law); United States v.
Sawyer (Sawyer!), 85 F.3d 713, 726 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that a violation of common law
may suffice as the basis for honest services fraud); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a scheme to defraud need not violate state law in order to
constitute honest services fraud).
62 See Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117; Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93; Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734;
Sawyer 1, 85 F.3d at 726; Bryan, 58 F.3d at 940.
63 See Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117; Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93; Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734.
64 See United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 62 (1st Cir. 1998); Sawyer I, 85 F.3d at
726.
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A. United States v. Sawyer and United States v. Woodward: Confusing
State Law with Federal Law
The First Circuit is the most outspoken federal appeals court to
have found that conduct of a public official need not violate state or
local law to be prosecuted under the federal mail and wire fraud stat-
utes.° The court first shed light on this view in its 1996 decision,
United States v. Sawyer." In Sawyer, the defendant was a lobbyist for the
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. ("Hancock"). 67 It was his
responsibility to persuade Massachusetts state legislators to adopt po-
sitions favorable to Hancock's interests in the insurance industry. 0 In
order to achieve this goal, he would pay for meals, rounds of golf, and
other entertainment for legislators. 69 He used the mails to submit ex-
pense reports to Hancock for reimbursement."
A jury found that this conduct was part of a scheme to defraud
the citizens and government of Massachusetts of the honest services
of their legislators. 71 The defendant was convicted of fifteen counts of
honest services mail fraud and nine counts of honest services wire
fraud. 72 He appealed his convictions, arguing that the government's
failure to prove that he violated Massachusetts' state law was fatal to its
case." The First Circuit noted that, in its view, the framework for es-
tablishing honest services mail fraud under § 1341 does not require
proof of a violation of any state statute.74 The court reversed Sawyer's
convictions, however, because it found that the instructions given to
the jury might have allowed the defendant to be convicted on an im-
proper basis."
66 See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 62; Sawyer I, 85 F.3d at 726.
66 See Sawyer I, 85 F.3d at 726.
67 See id. at 720.
66 See id. at 721.
69 See id.
7° See id.
71 See Sawyer I, 85 F.3d at 722.
73
 See id.
73 See id. Specifically, Sawyer alleged that, without a state law violation, his conviction
"impermissibly involveldJ the federal government in setting standards of good govern-
ment for local and state officials." Id.
74 See id. at 733 (citing United States v. Silvan°, 812 F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1987)).
75 See id. at 740-42. Specifically, the court held that the jury might have improperly
convicted Sawyer because it was not instructed that his conduct did not constitute mail or
wire fraud unless the government could also prove it was his intent to defraud the citizens,
the government, or both. See id. The court focused its reversal primarily upon his convic-
tions under the Travel Act but held that the mail and wire fraud counts were to be retried
as well. See id.
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In holding that a violation of a common law fiduciary duty is suf-
ficient for a prosecution of honest services fraud, the First Circuit cau-
tioned that, in its opinion, the incorporation of a discussion of a state
law violation may cause complications in a trial. 76 It noted that an
overemphasis on what state law forbids may lead a jury to believe that
state law, rather than federal, defines the crime." In the court's opin-
ion, this would open the door to the possibility that defendants would
be impermissibly convicted of a state law violation when they are in
fact charged with a federal crime. 78
The First Circuit reiterated its approach in its 1998 decision in
United States v. Woodward. 79
 In Woodward, the defendant was convicted of
four counts of mail and wire fraud in connection with his failure to dis-
close potential conflicts of interest in his capacity as a Massachusetts
state legislator.° In ruling on his appeal, the First Circuit once again
noted that a public official's duty to disclose potential conflicts of inter-
est can come not only from specific state disclosure statutes, but also
from general common law fiduciary duties that such officials owe to the
public. 81
 Although the defendant's violation of a Massachusetts disclo-
sure statute saved the Woodward court from having to decide whether a
violation of the defendant's common law duties would suffice as a basis
for a federal prosecution for honest services fraud, the court intimated
that, if pressed, it would likely find in the affirmative. 82
In the wake of Woodward, the DOJ decided to prosecute Sawyer
again.° In the second prosecution, Sawyer pled guilty to one charge of
76 See Sawyer I, 85 F.3d at 726.
77 See id.
78 See id. It is difficult to imagine such a possibility given that a state law violation ap-
pears to be a satisfactory predicate to mail or wire fraud even in those circuits that do not
require the defendant's conduct to violate state or local law in order to constitute the fed-
eral offense. See id.
79 See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 62.
a° See id. at 51-54.
81 See id. at 62 (noting that "separate and apart from the state statute `[t]he obligation
to disclose material information inheres in the legislator's general fiduciary duty to the
public.'" (quoting Sawyer I, 85 F.3d at 733 n.17)).
83 See id. at 57-62. Specifically, the court found that a reasonable jury could have in-
ferred from the circumstances surrounding the gratuities accepted by Woodward that the
fraudulent intent element of § 1341 was met, without mention of a state law violation. Id.
Although the fact that Woodward's conduct violated a Massachusetts state statute saved the
court from having to decide if this evidence alone would suffice to support a finding that
the intent element was met, the court's ruling that it at least supported such a finding was
evidence that, when faced with this question, it would likely find in the affirmative. See id
as See Sawyer II, 239 F.3d at 35-36.
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honest services mail fraud. 84 After he completed his probation and paid
his fines, Sawyer petitioned the First Circuit for a writ of error comm no-
bis.85 The writ of comma nobis is a petition in equity to reverse a judgment
against a defendant who has already served his sentence. 96 The First
Circuit rejected Sawyer's coram nobis petition.87 It began by noting that
the state must prove the defendant violated a state law only if the in-
dictment suggests that the state will use such a violation as the sole
means of proving his scheme or artifice to defraud." The court went on
to find that Sawyer's indictment was not predicated upon his violation of
Massachusetts' state law, and, consequently, that the government's fail-
ure to show such a violation was not fatal to the government's case.89
B. State Formed Parameters: The Third and Fifth Circuit Approach
1. United States v. Brumley: The Fifth CirCuit Approach
The position taken by the First Circuit in Sawyer directly conflicts
with the standard established by the Fifth Circuit in its landmark 1997
decision, United States v. Brumley." The defendant in that case, Michael
Bryant Brumley, was convicted of three counts of wire fraud in viola-
tion of § 1343.91 Brumley worked for the Texas Workers' Compensa-
tion Commission.92 He was responsible for identifying attorneys and
insurance carriers who had failed to follow state rules and regulations
for the industry." Brumley was alleged to have used these relation-
ships to secure more than $100,000 in unpaid "loans" from eleven
lawyers with whom he dealt." The money from these loans was trans-
ferred to Brumley via interstate wire, thus bringing the offense within
the jurisdiction of § 1343.95
In his appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Brumley argued that §§ 1341 and
1343 were unconstitutional." He argued that when Congress enacted
84 See id.
" See id. at 36.
88 See id. at 37-38.
87 See id. at 38.
es See Sawyer //, 239 F.3d at 42.
90 See id. at 43.
9° See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 731; Sawyer 1, 85 F.3d at 726.
9' See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 731.
n See id. at 730-31.
95 See id. at 731.
° See id.
See id.
98 See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 731.
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these statutes, it failed to state its purpose with the necessary clarity
demanded for federal regulation of state affairs. 97 The Fifth Circuit
conceded that, by passing § 1346, Congress overturned the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in McNally and explicitly expanded the scope of
the mail and wire fraud statutes so as to recognize the right to honest
services.98 Nevertheless, the question of whether these services must be
provided under state law remained. 99
In deciding this issue, the court found nothing in § 1346 to sup-
port the idea that Congress intended to give the federal government
the right to impose a federal vision of appropriate ethical standards on
states.'" The court, therefore, found that, in order for there to be a
violation of either § 1341 or § 1343 under the honest services rubric,
the services withheld or deprived must be owed under state law. 181 The
court explained that, to hold otherwise "would sorely tax separation of
powers and erode our federalist structure."'"
2. United States v. Panarella and United States v. Murphy: Third Circuit
Endorsement of the Fifth Circuit Approach
In its 2002 decision in United States u Panarella, the Third Circuit
joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that a violation of either § 1341 or
§ 1343 under the honest services rubric of § 1346 requires a violation of
either state or local law.'" In Panarella, the defendant appealed a convic-
tion of being an accessory after the fact to a wire fraud scheme in viola-
tion of §§ 1343 and 1346. 1 " The government alleged that the scheme,
undertaken with F. Joseph Loeper, Jr., a Pennsylvania state senator, de-
prived the citizens of Pennsylvania of the senator's honest services as a
legislator.' °s
The defendant ran a tax collection business that entered into con-
tracts with various Pennsylvania state and local bodies to collect taxes
owed to them under state and local laws.'" His business depended heav-
97 See id.
os See id. at 733.
99 Sce id. at 733-34.
100 See id. at 734.
161 See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734-35. The Fifth Circuit did not differentiate between state
civil or criminal law, suggesting that, in its view, a violation of either would suffice as a
predicate for honest services mail or wire fraud. Id.
192 See id. at 734.
1 ° 6 See 277 F.3d at 692-93; see also Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117.
104 See 277 F.3d at 692-93.
199 See id. at 679.
106 See id. at 681.
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By upon its ability to collect Pennsylvania's business privilege tax from
nonresident businesses. 107 Beginning in 1993, the defendant hired
Senator Loeper, the majority leader of the Pennsylvania Senate, as a
business consultant. 108 Senator Loeper helped Panarella's business in a
variety of ways, but the conduct that led to the wire fraud charges was his
speaking and voting against proposed state legislation that would have
restricted the enforcement of the business privilege tax and would have
harmed Panarella's business interests. 109. During this period, Senator
Loeper also failed to disclose his income from Panarella as required by
Pennsylvania state law. 110
. In his appeal, Panarella contended that the facts did not establish
that Senator Loeper had committed honest services fraud," Thus, he
argued that he could not be an accomplice after the fact. 112 He urged
the Third Circuit to adopt a limiting principle established by the Sev-
enth Circuit in its 1998 decision, United States u Bloom. 113 In Bloom, the
Seventh Circuit held that an employee deprives his employer of his
honest services only if he misuses his position for personal gain.114
Panarella argued that Senator Loeper was an employee of the public
and that, because there was no allegation that Senator Loeper sold his
vote or that his financial relationship with Panarella inflitenced his de-
cision to speak and vote against the proposed legislation, he had not
misused his position for personal gain. 115 Thus, according to Panarella,
under the Bloom approach, the scheme could not be prosecuted as
fraud under § 1343. 116
The Third Circuit declined to adopt the Seventh Circuit's limiting
principle, noting that it found it too ambiguous in the public honest
services context. 117 Instead, the Third Circuit decided that "state law
offers a better limiting principle of determining when an official's fail-
ure to disclose a conflict of interest amounts to honest services
fraud:gni The court restricted its use of state law parameters for public
107 See id.
Kia See id.
1°9 See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681.
no See id.
ul See id. at 679.
112 See id.
115 See id. at 691; United Statei v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649,656-57 (7th Cir. 1998).
" 4 See 149 F.3d at 656-57.
See id.
116 See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 691; Bloom, 149 F.3d at 656-57.
" 7 See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93.
118 See id.
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honest services fraud to cases involving conflicts of interest. 119 The
court noted that the facts in Panarella did not require it to decide
whether state law provided the proper boundaries in all public honest
services fraud cases. 120
The next year, however, in its 2003 decision in United States u Mur-
phy, the Third Circuit intimated that, should it be forced to make such
a ruling in the future, it would likely adopt the broad approach an-
nounced by the Fifth Circuit in BrumIg. 121 In Murphy, Peter A. Murphy,
the Chairman of New Jersey's Passaic County Republican Party, was
found to have used his influence on county officials to orchestrate a
contracts-for-payments scheme in violation of §§ 1341 and 1346. 122
Murphy used his political influence to ensure that the county freehold-
ers awarded certain municipal contracts to a corporation that would
siphon of money received from these contracts to a panel of four indi-
viduals whom Murphy had chosen. 123 These individuals performed no
useful services in return for the payments. 124
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed Murphy's conviction. 125 It
decided that the government had failed to identify any clearly estab-
lished fiduciary relationship or legal duty in either federal or state law
between Murphy and Passaic County or its citizens. 126 The government
asserted that a state bribery statute created such a fiduciary duty, but
the court rejected this proposition. 127 It explained that, under such a
reading, all criminal activity would breach a duty to the public not to
break the law and could then form the basis of a mail or wire fraud
conviction. 128 The court went on to note in dicta that it endorsed the
decisions of other courts of appeals that interpreted § 1346 more strin-
gently and required a state law limiting principle for honest services
fraud. 129 Thus, although the Third Circuit did not find that the bribery
1119
 See id. at 692.
l" See id. at 691-92.
121 See Murphy, 323 F.3d at 116.
122 See id. at 104.
' 23 See id. at 106-08.
124 See id. at 107.
128 Id. at 117.
128 See Murphy, 323 F.Sd at 117.
127 See id.
128 See id. In essence, the Third Circuit was rejecting what it perceived to be a potential
bootstrapping problem. See id. The court felt that honest services fraud would be an
impermissibly broad doctrine if any violation of state or law could be used by the govern-
ment to establish a breach of the individual's fiduciary duty to the public, which includes
the duty not to violate the law in the first place. See id.
149 See id. at 116.
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statute created a predicate fiduciary duty for an honest services prose-
cution, the court endorsed the process of relying on state law to set the
parameters.'"
III. THE PREFERENCE FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed a general
preference for limiting the scope of the federal government's regula-
tory power."' There are certain subjects, however, that the Court has
excepted from this preference."2 Regulation of political corruption is
one such subject.'"
Two decisions from the Supreme Court, McConnell u Federal Election
Commission. and Sabri v. United States illustrate this exception."4 McConnell
involved a First Amendment challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Act of 2002 ("BCFRA”). 135 In Sabri, a private developer
accused of offering kickbacks to a city official appealed his conviction
under a federal bribery statute. 136
A. Limiting Campaign Contributions Not Unconstitutional
In McConnell, the plaintiff challenged BCFRA on a number of
grounds. 1 S 7 One claim was that restricting campaign contributions at the
federal level is an impermissible restriction of freedom of speech in vio-
"0 See id. at 117.
131 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding that Congress
may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997)
(holding that the federal government may not compel the states to enact or to administer
a federal regulatory program); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding
that, because its connection with interstate commerce was too attenuated, a federal law
criminalizing the knowing possession a firearm in a school district exceeded Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause).
133 See Sabri v United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004); McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003); see also George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corrup-
tion7—Mail Fraud, State Law, and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 252-53
(1997). Professor Brown notes that the Court's restriction of the scope of Congress's regu-
latory power has resulted primarily from challenges to laws promulgated under the au-
thority of the Commerce Clause, but that because the Court found that it is a stretch to go
from commerce to regulating guns near schools, they might also find Congress's espoused
authority for other statutes to be too attenuated, especially in the realm of regulating cor-
ruption. See Brown, supra, at 252-53.
133 See Salmi, 541 U.S. at 606; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136.
134 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136,
133 See 540 U.S. at 114.
138 See 541 U.S. at 606.
137 See 540 U.S. at 114.
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lation of the First Amendment. 138
 Although the Supreme Court agreed
that direct limits on campaign contributions had a "marginal impact on
political speech," it held that they did not violate the First Amend-
ment. 139
 The Court explained that the burdens that such limits place
upon First Amendment freedoms must be weighed against the govern-
ment's interest in preserving its legitimacy against corruption. 4u
 Thus,
the Court cautioned that, in reviewing Congress's decision to enact such
limits, "there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutional-
ity. "141 This portion of the McConnell decision represents an exception to
the Court's recent preference for restricting Congress's authority when
the goal of the regulation is to limit political corruption. 142
The McConnell plaintiffs also claimed that parts of the new law vio-
lated the principles of federalism by impairing the authority of the states
to regulate their own elections. 143 The Court dismissed this argument,
however, noting that, unlike previously stricken regulatory schemes, the
BCFRA did not compel state governmental action.'" The Court de-
cided that the BCFRA simply regulated the behavior of private parties
and did not preempt the states' ability to enact further regulations. 145
B. Federal Criminalization of Bribery of Local Officials Whose Entities
Receive Federal Funding Not Unconstitutional
In Sabri, the defendant appealed his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 666. 146 Section 666 criminalizes the bribery of state, local, and tribal
officials of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds. 147 Sa-
bri, a Minneapolis real estate developer, had offered three separate
kickbacks to a city council member in exchange for securing certain
regulatory approvals and grants for his business ventures. 148 In his ap-
peal, Sabri argued that § 666 was unconstitutional. 149
1]8 See id. at 138-39.
139 See id. at 140.
140 See id. at 136.
141 See id.
142 See 540 U.S. at 136.
143 See id. at 186. The plaintiffs alleged that, because the law applies to state election
candidates, it compels states to implement a federal regulatory scheme in violation of the
Tenth Amendment. See id.
144 See Id.
145 See Id.
146 See 541 U.S. at 602.
147 See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000); Sabra, 541 U.S. at 602.
' 48 See Saint 541 U.S. at 602-03.
140 See id. at 602.
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Sabri claimed that § 666 was facially unconstitutional because it
failed to establish a nexus between the bribe or kickback and the fed-
eral funds received by the public entity. 15° In rejecting this argument,
the Supreme Court decided that Congress had the authority to enact
laws like § 666 to ensure that the funds it appropriates are in fact
spent for the general welfare."' This line of reasoning covers prosecu-
tions where the bribe or kickback is skimmed directly from federal
funds or is used to influence the spending of federal grant money. 152
The Court went further and held that "corruption does not have to
be that limited to affect the federal interest."'" In its discussion of this
holding, the Court explained that the receipt of federal funds estab-
lishes a sufficient federal interest in the regulation of potential cor-
ruption of the state or local entities' affairs. 154 Therefore, the Court
held, federal funds need not be affected for a violation of § 666 to
accrue. 155 This holding is another example of the Court's willingness
to except corruption from its recent pattern of limiting the scope of
Congress's regulatory power.' 56
IV. STATE INCAPACITY: SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FOR THE FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF SUB-NATIONAL HONEST SERVICES
MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD
In evaluating the current circuit split over the federal prosecution
of honest services mail and wire fraud in connection with state and lo-
cal officials, a threshold question is whether the federal government
ought to be prosecuting corruption at the sub-national level at a11. 157
' 5° See id. at 604.
151 See id. at 605.
152 See id. at 605-06.
1" See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 The pervasive nature of the academic discussion of this issue suggests that it is a
threshold question that must be answered before further analysis can be undertaken. See,
e.g., Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political Corruption, 10
PEPP. L. Rev. 321, 334-42 (1983) (detailing the concerns about federal prosecutions that
arise from the theories of separation of powers and federalism); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many
and Yet Too Few: . New Principle,: to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 979,983-88 (1995) (discussing the effects that expanding federal criminal
jurisdiction has on the workload of federal courts); George D. Brown, New Federalism's Un-
answered Question: Who Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for Corruption?, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 417,440-48 (2003) (outlining much of the academic debate surrounding this
question, both before and after the Court's espousal of new federalism"); Joshua A. Ko-
brin, Betraying Honest Services: . Theories of Trust and Betrayal Applied to the Mail Fraud Statute
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it should, the next question is whether the rationale for allowing such
prosecutions generally can be persuasively used to argue for federal
prosecution of honest services mail and wire fraud in connection with
sub-national public officials. 158 Assuming that such prosecutions can be
justified, the fnial question is: What limits, if any, are needed in order to
protect the states' autonomy within the federalist structure of the U.S.
Constitution? 159
To answer the threshold question of whether the federal govern-
ment ought to regulate state and local corruption generally, one must
look first to recent Supreme Court decisions. 160 McConnell v. Federal Elm-
tion Commission and Sabri u United Slates both demonstrate that the Su-
preme Court has been willing to except the realm of political corrup-
tion from its preference for a limited federal regulatory power. 161 In
each case, the Court found that a federal statute dealing with political
corruption withstood a challenge relating to the proper scope of the
federal government's regulatory power. 162 Although these cases illus-
trate the Court's willingness to expand the scope of federal regulatory
power in this realm, they do not provide persuasive authority for fed-
eral prosecution of sub-national public officials for honest services mail
and wire fraud. 163
In Sabri, Justice Sauter, writing for the majority, relied on the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution as authority for a federal statute that
criminalizes the bribery of state, local, and tribal officials of entities that
receive at least $10,000 in federal funds." The parallels between hon-
est services mail and wire fraud and this federal bribery statute, how-
ever, are weak. 165 Although Congress has jurisdiction over the mails and
and 1 1346, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. Suuv. Ass. L. 779, 782-83 (2006) (noting that federalism has
spurred scholarly concern regarding federal prosecutions of state and local officials);
Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local
Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 376-81 (1989) (discussing the rationales for federal in-
volvement in prosecuting state and local corruption); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud
and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Mitch over Us, 31 HARv. J. om LEGIS. 153, 171-78
(1994) (discussing federalism concerns regarding the intangible rights theory of honest
services fraud).
158 See infra notes 163-174 and accompanying text.
"5 See infra notes 210-236 and accompanying text.
158 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004); McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003).
181 See Sabri, 541 U.S, at 606; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136.
152 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136.
185 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136.
1 " See 541 U.S. at 605.
165 See id.
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wires, it would be difficult to establish that fraud schemes utilizing the
mails and wires interfere with the smooth operation of such mediums
in the same way similar schemes may prevent sub-national governmen-
tal entities from using federally appropriated funds for the general wel-
fare. 166
Justice Stevens advanced this argument in his dissent in McNally v.
United States. 167 According to Justice Stevens, the mail fraud statute was
enacted to protect the United States mails by not allowing them to be
used as instruments of crime. 168 Though this may have been Congress's
intent at the time the statute was enacted, Stevens went on to note his
approval of the expansion of the interpretation through the years to
the point that its jurisdictional hook is now used as a means by which
Congress can regulate activities it might not otherwise be able to
reach. 169
In McConnell, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal
statute limiting campaign contributions.'" in so doing, the Court
found that, because the law was properly tailored to effectuate the fed-
eral interest in good government, it was permissible that it might result
in some restrictions on First Amendment rights."' The parallels be-
tween the honest services mail and wire fraud statutes and the Biparti-
san Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 ("BCFRA") in McConnell are
also weak.'" Although both paradigms owe their existence to the goal
of good government, BCFRA's ability to withstand a First Amendment
challenge provides little insight into how federal prosecution of sub-
national public officials for honest services mail and wire fraud might
overcome federalism-based challenges.'" Therefore, although both
Sabri and McConnell are illustrative of the Court's general willingness to
grant the federal government broad power to deal with political cor-
166 See id.
167 See 483 U.S. 350, 366 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Act of Nov.
18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100.690, 102 Stat. 4508.
laa See id.
169 See Brown, supra note 157, at 253. Professor Brown notes that the postal power
found in Article I, Section 8 "contains the seeds of a mini-national police power over a
broad range of activities normally subject to state regulation." Id. Thus, although federal
prosecution of state and local officials under 18 U.S.C. § 666 may be justified because of a
clearly elucidated federal interest in overseeing entities that receive federal funds, federal
prosecutions of state and local officials under §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346 struggle to utilize
the same rationale because the espoused federal interest is much more attenuated. See id.
170 See 540 U.S. at 186.
171 See id. at 136-37.
1" See id.
173 See id.
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ruption, the reasoning of the two cases fails to account for the existence
of federal honest services mail and wire fraud prosecutions of sub-
national public officials."4
A. The Incapacity Theory
A more persuasive argument for the need for federal honest ser-
vices mail and wire fraud prosecutions of state or local public officials is
that the unique nature of political corruption inhibits the states' ability
to deal with it internally. 176 This "incapacity to act" theory is typically
advanced as an argument in favor of federal intervention in issues that
create collective action problems for the states. 176 These issues typically
involve business regulation or the distribution of social benefits. 177 Pro-
ponents of the theory assert that a state may choose to regulate busi-
nesses leniently or not regulate them at all, out of fear that they will
lose business to other states with more lax regulations. 178 Likewise, a
state may choose not to give certain benefits to disadvantaged groups in
order to avoid attracting more of those residents to their borders.'"
The states' inability to regulate their own political corruption,
however, does not arise from such competitive forces. 18° Rather, it is the
very nature of public corruption that prevents states from effectively
preventing it. 181 Public corruption erodes government, and, because
law enforcement bodies are generally part of the government, they too
174 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 186.
176 See Baxter, supra note 157, at 339 ("If state and local corruption causes the break-
down of local law enforcement, the case for federal intervention is strong."); Brown, supra
note 157, at 492 n.608 (noting that some scholars have called for federal involvement in
state criminal law in areas in which "[t] he national government has a distinct advantage as
compared to state criminal justice systems in detecting, prosecuting, or punishing a par-
ticular behavior"); see also Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS
Li. 1029, 1077-81 (1995) (explaining Professor Little's theory that there exists a rebut-
table presumption against federal intervention in state criminal affairs that may be over-
come by a demonstration of the state and local authorities' failure to.adequately deal with
the conduct).
176 CI Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE Li. 1196, 1212 (1977) (noting that
individual states may rationally decline to adopt, unilaterally, high environmental stan-
dards that inhibit economic development out of fear that the benefits of a cleaner envi-
ronment will be outweighed by the economic losses that will result from the movement of
businesses to other states with lower standards).
"7 See id.
176 See id.
179 See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 121-26 (1995).
180 See Brown, supra note 157, at 492 n.608.
18! See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
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are eroded by the corruption and therefore cannot act to curb it. 192
This discrepancy, however, has not prevented many legal scholars from
legitimizing federal regulation of state and local political corruption
based upon the states' incapacity to act. 199
The Supreme Court has accepted the Incapacity to act" argument
as a rebuttal to attacks against other broad federal criminal statutes
based upon federalism concerns. 194 ,For example, the Court accepted
this line of reasoning in two separate cases, Perrin v. United States and
United States v. Turkette. 185 In Perrin, the defendant invoked federalism in
asking the Court to narrowly define bribery under the Travel Act.'"
Similarly; in Turkette, the defendant asked for a narrow definition of
"enterprise" under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (the "RICO" Act). 197 In each case, the defendant ar-
gued that a broad interpretation of the contested term would upset the
federal-state law enforcement balance.'" In each case, however, the
Court accepted state inadequacy as the proper justification for broad
federal criminal statutes—and as a satisfactory rebuttal to federalism-
based arguments against them. 189
B. Operation. Greylord: The Incapacity Theory in Practice
The "incapacity to act" theory provides a persuasive rationale for
the federal prosecution of sub-national public 'officials for honest ser-
vices mail and wire fraud. 19° The difficulty with accepting this theory on
its face, however, is that state inaction may not be indicative of an in-
ability to act. 191 Rather, it might be the case that states accept certain
behavior from their public officials and thus choose not to prosecute
1 E2 See Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., The Mollen Commission and Beyond, 40 N.Y.L. Scii. L. REV.
5,5-11 (1995) (expressing frustration with respect to the possibility of effectively eradicat-
ing police corruption in New York).
193 See Brown, supra note 157, at 492 n.608.
184 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,579-80 (1981); Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37,49-50 (1979).
no See 7lithette, 452 U.S. at 579-80; Perrin, 444 U.S. at 49-50; Brown, supra note 157, at
494-95.
'86 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); Perrin, 444 U.S. at 49-50.
187 See 18 U.S.CA § 1961 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579-80.
ma See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579-80; Perrin, 444 U.S. at 49-50,
199 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579-80; Perrin, 444 U.S. at 49-50.
199 See supra notes 175-189 and accompanying text.
191 See Brown, supra note 157, at 493-95 (noting that Professor Little's theory requires
actual proof of state inadequacy in order to rebut the presumption against federal inter-
vention and that such proof is very difficult to obtain).
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these officials for corruption. 192 If this is the case, then any federal
prosecution would represent a severe restriction of state autonomy
within the federalist structure.' 93 The states cannot be said to be sover-
eign entities if the federal government is allowed to fully direct their
public policy choices.'"
There is, however, strong historical evidence that suggests that it is
more likely that states are unable, not unwilling, to deal with internal
public corruption.'" A prime example is Operation Greylord. 196 Op-
eration Greylord was the code name for an investigation into judicial
corruption in Cook County, Illinois, in the 1980s.'" The investigation
was conducted jointly by the FBI and the IRS.'" It resulted in the in-
dictment of seventeen judges, forty-eight lawyers, eight policemen, ten
deputy sheriffs, eight court officials, and one state legislator on varying
charges of racketeering; bribery; and tax, mail, and wire fraud. 199
Brocton Lockwood, a local judge who rotated through Cook
County at the time, blew the whistle for Operation Greylord. 2" Lock-
wood considered the idea of pursuing the prosecution of the corrup-
tion he observed in state or local court."' In the end, however, he de-
termined that the judicial nature of the corruption would have made it
difficult to secure successful prosecutions and might have jeopardized
192 se, a
L" Cf. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Ethics: Nepotism Restrictions for State Legisla-
tors (Dec. 31, 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ethics/e_nepotism.htm . As of De-
cember 31, 2006, state laws varied widely as to the restrictions they place on their legisla-
tors with respect to nepotism. See id. If a state law violation is not a predicate for honest
services, differences amongst the states in such areas would be ignored in favor of a federal
policy. See id.
194 See ER WIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 305-07
(3d ed. 2002). Professor Chemerinsky notes that two of the most frequently invoked bene-
fits of federalism are its protection of state governments from federal tyranny and state
governments' more responsive nature with respect to public needs and concerns. See id.
198 See BROCTON LOCKWOOD & HARLAN FL MENDENHALL, OPERATION GREYLORD: BROC-
TON LocKwooD's STORY 36-37 (1989). A special thanks to R. Michael Cassidy, Associate
Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law at Boston College Law School for pointing
out this excellent illustration of the state incapacity theory.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 57. Specifically, the investigation uncovered a system in which Chicago-
area judges were fixing cases in exchange for monetary payments facilitated through
prominent community members. See Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Inves-
tigations of Public Corruption: Rooting Crookedness Out of Government (Mar. 15, 2004),
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/naarch04/greylord031504.htm.
198 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 197.
199 See id.
200 See LOCKWOOD & MENDENHALL, supra note 195, at 36-37, 40-41.
201 See id. at 36-37 (outlining Lockwood's intended plan to alert Illinois officials about
the corruption he witnessed in Cook County).
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his career on the bench. 202 Therefore, he approached the FBI with the
information, which led to federal, rather than state or local, prosecu-
tions for those associated with the corruption in Cook County. 203
Lockwood's discussion of his motivation for involving federal—
rather than state=law enforcement, read along with a series of arti-
cles written by Mike Royko of the Chicago Tribune, indicate that at least
some Illinois residents and public officials sought to regulate public
corruption in the state but felt that the state mechanisms were not up
to the task.204 Thus, Operation Greylord is a powerful example of a
state's incapacity to act with respect to regulating its own public cor-
ruption.205 As such, it provides further and more concrete backing for
the argument that the states' incapacity to act provides a persuasive
justification for federal prosecution of state and local honest services
mail and wire fraud. 206
This is not to suggest, however, that the federal government ought
to be given carte blanch with respect to such prosecutions. 207 Sensible
limits must be placed on the federal government's authority in order to
202 See id. Lockwood notes that, in considering his option to send a letter to state offi-
cials, he "certainly didn't expect to change anything within the Chicago system." Id. In his
view, the problems were too deeply entrenched." Id. He notes further that sending that
letter might have been risky as far as his future was concerned because he was fearful of
losing his job. See id.
20 See id. at 40-41.
204 See id. at 36-37; see also Mike Royko, An Unqualified Bit of Nonesense, CHI. This., No 4,
1986, at C3 [hereinafter Royko, Nonsense] (referencing a lawyer who, before the Greylord
investigation became public, urged voters in upcoming judicial elections not to be swayed by
negative stories about certain judges that had appeared in the media, but instead to trust the
Chicago Bar Association, which had rated many of these judges as "qualified"; many of these
judges were later convicted in connection with the Greylord investigation); Mike Royko, Gay-
lord Mud Splatters Em Alt; Cttr. Tam., June 4,1984, at AS [hereinafter Royko, Greylord] (noting
that the commentator felt no sympathy for those "honest" judges and lawyers whose reputa-
tions were tarnished by the Greylord scandal because they knew about the corruption and
did nothing about it" and, further, that one prosecutor had told him, off the record, that he
would be crazy to blow the whistle on the corruption because it would ruin his chances of
becoming a judge). These articles demonstrate not only the public awareness of the judicial
corruption in Cook County in the 1980s, but also the general public sentiment that such
corruption was unacceptable. See Royko, Nonsens4 supra; Royko, Greylord, supra. Thus, read
together with Lockwood's account of his whistle-blowing activities, these articles support the
conclusion that not only do states generally not approve of their internal public corruption,
but that they are also particularly ill-equipped to deal with such problems internally. See
Locxwoon & MENDENHALL, supra note 195, at 36-37, 40-41; Royko, Nonesense, supra Royko,
Gre'ylard, supra. According to Professor Little, such a demonstrated failure on the part of the
states is a necessary perquisite to a state incapacity justification for federal intervention in
state criminal affairs. See Little, supra note 175, at 1077-81.
205 See Locttwoon & MENDENHALL, supra note 195, at 36-37,40-41. •
200 See id.
207 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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protect the states' autonomy within the federalist structure. 208 This is
where the Third and Fifth Circuits' approach to honest services mail
and wire fraud comes into play. 209
V. THE THIRD AND FIFTH CIRCUITS' APPROACH: SENSIBLE
LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER
Although the Incapacity to act" theory provides a justification for
federal prosecution of honest services mail and wire fraud in connec-
tion with state and local public corruption, it does not answer the ques-
tion of what limits should be placed on the federal government's au-
thority within this realm. 21 ° Such limits are necessary because, without
them, state sovereignty is threatened. 211 After all, if the federal govern-
ment is permitted to both define "honest services" and prosecute indi-
viduals in connection with state and local public officials not providing
such "honest services," the federal government is impermissibly al-
lowed to direct state public policy.212
The prosecution in Mississippi of Paul Minor is a good illustra-
tion of such threats to state autonomy. 213 Minor was prosecuted in
federal district court in Mississippi for honest services mail and wire
fraud.214 He was found to have used the mails and wires to help guar-
antee a loan that allowed a Mississippi Supreme Court justice, in front
208 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
21)9 See United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 691-92 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734
(5th Cir. 1997).
210 See supra notes 157-209 and accompanying text.
211 See Moohr, supra note 157, at 172 ("An examination of the benefits of a federalist
system leads to the conclusion that the application of the intangible rights doctrine to state
and local political corruption diminishes those benefits and damages the federalist sys-
tem."). Ultimately, Moohr concludes that the incorporation of intangible rights makes the
mail fraud statute void for vagueness. See id. at 153. Although this Note stops well short of
Moohr's conclusion, her discussion of the concerns that honest services mail fraud poses
to federalism is indicative of the need to limit the scope of the federal government's power
in this realm. See id; see also Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37 (noting that the broad discre-
tion to prosecute state and local corruption that federal prosecutors enjoy 'tray result in a
radical alteration of the balance of law enforcement responsibility between the states and
the federal government, contrary to constitutional notions of federalism").
212 See Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note 157, at 175-76 ("The power
federal prosecutors exercise over the political affairs of states and cities [within this frame-
work] is particularly troublesome ... [because] states traditionally have the 'principal re-
sponsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes."' (quoting Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 195 (1959))).
210 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150; Horton, supra note 6.
214 See Third Superceding Indictment, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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of whom Minor practiced, to secure financing for his re-election cam-
paign. 415 The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOD successfully alleged
that this scheme deprived the citizens and government of Mississippi
of the honest services of the judge. 216
Had there been a Mississippi state law criminalizing Minor's con-
duct, it would have indicated that the citizens and government of the
state felt that such conduct defrauded them of their right to the honest
services of their public officials. 217 This, in conjunction with the state
"incapacity to act" theory, would have indicated a need for Minor's
prosecution by the federal government. 218 There is, however, no Missis-
sippi state law that prohibits an attorney like Minor from assisting a
judge before whom he practices in this manner. 219 Nothing indicates
that the citizens and or government of Mississippi feel that such actions
defraud them of their right to the honest services of their public offi-
cial s.22o Thus, Minor was prosecuted under a federal common law the-
ory of good government. 221 This amounts, in essence, to the federal
government not only enacting a Mississippi criminal statute, but also
using its own discretion in deciding against whom the statute will be
enforced.222
Minor's prosecution demonstrates that, when the federal gov-
ernment is permitted to both define "honest services" within states
and localities and prosecute individuals who do not provide such
"honest services," the states are cut out of the process of crafting their
own standards of ethics for their public officials. 228 In Minor's case,
the federal government essentially determined what the citizens of
Mississippi should demand from their public officials without consult-
216 See Longstreth, 514pra note 1, at 153; Horton, supra note 6; Letter from Paul Minor,
supra note 9 (explaining that Minor guaranteed the loan in an attempt to help offset
money contributed to Diaz's opponent by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which had
identified Diaz as "anti-business").
216 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150, 152; Horton, supra note 6.
217 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150, 152; Horton, supra note 6.
sus See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150, 152; Horton, supra note 6.
219 See Horton, supra note 6 (explaining that, not only is there no such Mississippi law,
but that the practice is commonplace); cf. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3r1 1312, 1322-23 (11th
Cir. 2002) (holding that Section (B) (2) of Canon 7 of the Georgia Code of Judicial Con-
duct, which prohibits judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contribu-
tions, impermissibly chilled candidates' speech and thus violated the First Amendment).
22° See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150, 152; Horton. supra note 6.
221 See Longstreth, supra note 1, at 150, 152; Horton, supra note 6.
222 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
225 See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 193.
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ing those very same citizens.224
 Such a usurpation of state sovereignty
by the federal government is grossly inappropriate. 225
Although an appeal of Minor's convictions remains pending as of
early 2008, his case is illustrative of the danger to state sovereignty that
results when the federal government is given carte blanche to prose-
cute individuals for honest services mail and wire fraud in connection
with state or local public officials. 226
 In order to protect state sover-
eignty, sensible limits must be placed on this federal authority. 227 The
approach to such honest services mail and wire fraud prosecutions
espoused by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Brumley, and endorsed
by the Third Circuit in United States v. Panarella and United States v.
Murphy, provides such limits."
In Brumley, the Fifth Circuit held that, in order for the federal gov-
ernment to prosecute an individual for honest services mail or wire
fraud in connection with state or local public corruption, the underly-
ing conduct must first violate state or local law in the jurisdiction.228
Though it has never made such an express holding, the Third Circuit
has endorsed this approach. 2" This approach protects state sovereignty
because it allows the states to set the parameters of honest services mail
and wire fraud prosecutions in connection with public officials. 231
In order to understand why it is necessary to allow the states to set
these parameters, one need look no further than to the rationale for
permitting the federal government to prosecute individuals for honest
services mail and wire fraud in connection with state and local public
224 See Horton, supra note 6; Mississippi Churning, supra note 16. Both Horton's article
and Roger Shuler's blog point out that there is no Mississippi state law prohibiting Minor's
conduct and thus he was prosecuted tinder a federal common law standard of good gov-
ernment that was formulated by federal prosecutors without input for the residents of
Mississippi. See Horton, supra note 6; Mississippi Churning, supra note 16.
225
	 Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note 157, at 175-76.
228 See Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note 157, at 175-76.
227 See supra notes 157-209,211,213 and accompanying text.
228 Sec Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117; Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93; Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734;
see also Brown, supra note 132, at 282-86 (suggesting state law is likely a proper limiting
principle for honest services mail fraud prosecutions in light of concerns that, without
such a limiting principle, the law would be void for vagueness).
228
 See 116 F.3d at 734,
288 See Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117; Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93.
281 See Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note 157, at 175-76. Specifically,
Baxter and Moohr note that allowing the federal government the discretion to both define
and prosecute criminal laws raises federalism concerns because this is a function typically
reserved for the states. See Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note 157, at
175-76.
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corruption at all. 232 As previously discussed, the rationale for these
prosecutions is that the states would prefer to prosecute these crimes,
but due to their incapacity to do so, federal enforcement is necessary. 233
This need for third-party enforcement does not, however, charge the
federal government with a duty to determine what is criminal in the
first place. 234 Thus, it is an unnecessary and inappropriate usurpation
of state power for the federal government to both define "honest ser-
vices" in the public realm, and prosecute schemes that deny such ser-
vices to the residents and the government of a state. 233 Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit's approach appropriately balances law-enforcement pow-
ers between the federal and state governments in this realm. 236
CONCLUSION
The American history of corrupt public officials is long, storied,
and no doubt continues through the present day. Through much of
this history, the federal government has sought to criminalize and
prosecute this behavior. As Salmi v. United States and McConnell it Federal
Election Commission demonstrate, such action by the federal government
aligns with the generally accepted American public policy goal of regu-
lating public corruption. Further, as Operation Greylord and the "in-
capacity to act" theory demonstrate, such federal action is often neces-
sary. There is, however, a point at which pervasive federal authority
threatens to trample the sovereignty afforded to the states by the feder-
alist structure of the Constitution.
The threats to state sovereignty are particularly acute in the realm
of honest services mail or wire fraud prosecutions in connection with
state or local public officials. The nature of public corruption requires
federal agency intervention in order to successfully prosecute such
crimes. This is because federal law enforcement agencies are less suscep-
tible to forces that spur state and local public corruption. For example,
Assistant United States Attorney's are not subject to election pressures.
The principles of federalism, however, dictate that states ought to de-
232 See supra notes 157-209 and accompanying text.
233 See sttpra notes 157-209 and accompanying text.
234 See Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note 157, at 175-76 (noting that
the power federal prosecutors exercise over the political affairs of states and cities within
this framework is particularly troublesome because states traditionally have the principal
responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes).
235 See Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note 157, at 175-76.
236 See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734; Baxter, supra note 157, at 336-37; Moohr, supra note
157, at 175-76.
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termine when such prosecutions are necessary. Thus, the approach to
honest services mail and wire fraud prosecutions espoused by the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Brumley, and endorsed by the Third Circuit in
United States v. Panarella and United States v. Milky, should be favored
over the more liberal approach taken by the First Circuit in United States
v. Sawyer and United States v. Woodward.
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